



Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management 
Introduction  
Attempts to develop a global consensus on how to respond to civil wars and inter-communal 
violence have failed. Ideas of liberal peacebuilding are increasingly contested in the international 
system. The UN Security Council has become deadlocked over questions of sovereignty, regime 
change, and intervention. In place of negotiations and peacebuilding, governments have 
increasingly resorted to authoritarian practices and  state coercion to suppress armed rebellions 
(Baglione, 2008; Goodhand, 2010; Lewis, 2010; Piccolino, 2015; Russell, 2012; Smith, 2014). 
Internationally negotiated settlements, which became a common mode of civil war termination in 
the 1990s, began to decline in frequency in the 2000s. By the 2010s norms of peace and conflict 
were increasingly contested, and some argued that the historical norm of wars being resolved 
primarily through military victories was being restored (Kovacs and Svensson 2013). In cases such 
as Chechnya and Sri Lanka, military victories successfully ended long periods of armed conflict, 
posing a major political challenge to proponents of liberal peacebuilding. This shift towards 
authoritarian mechanisms of conflict management reflects significant changes in the liberal 
international order, including the increasing influence of authoritarian powers, such as Russia and 
China, on global governance (Gat, 2007; Mead, 2014). These trends in state responses to internal 
conflict are one aspect of a much wider process of contestation of liberal norms and practices in 
the international system (Acharya, 2011; Cooley, 2015; Wolff, Jonas and Zimmermann, 2016).  
 In this article we suggest that existing research has not yet sufficiently recognised this important 
shift in conflict management practices. Scholarship in peace and conflict studies tends to avoid 
hard cases of ‘illiberal peace’, or examines them through simplistic conceptual frameworks. A 
limited understanding of the nature of these authoritarian responses not only leaves an important 
lacuna in academic research on contemporary conflict, it also inhibits the development of adequate 
policy responses. Drawing on accounts of state responses to conflicts in Russia, Sri Lanka, China, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Turkey, we develop an alternative conceptual framework to understand 
what we term Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) as a form of wartime and post-conflict 
order in its own right. While ACM does not comprise a coherent  normative and policy framework, 
we argue that there are certain shared theoretical premises and common practices across these 
cases. Conceptualising these similarities within a robust theoretical framework enables us to lay 
the groundwork for a more sophisticated typology of modes of civil war cessation and conflict 
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management. This article is therefore primarily an initial exercise in theoretical ground clearance 
and conceptual framing for an emerging academic and policy debate. It forms part of a much wider 
research agenda being undertaken by the authors. 
The article proceeds as follows. The first part surveys the limitations of the liberal peace debate, 
in which neither proponents of the liberal peace nor its numerous critics are able to offer 
convincing explanatory frameworks to assess existing practices of contemporary conflict 
management. The second section outlines an alternative conceptual framework of authoritarian 
conflict management that analyses practices in three major categories: discourse (state propaganda, 
information control, and knowledge production); spatial politics (both military and civilian modes 
of producing and controlling new spaces); and political economy (the hierarchical distribution of 
resources to produce particular political outcomes). In conclusion, we propose a research agenda 
that moves on from discussions of liberal peace to examine hard cases of contemporary conflict 
and conflict management. 
Liberal and Illiberal Peace 
 
This ‘illiberal turn’ in conflict management is best understood in the context of a theoretical and 
political crisis in the ‘liberal peace’, the set of discourses and practices that governed international 
interventions in civil wars after the Cold War (Richmond, 2006; Heathershaw, 2008; Joshi et al, 
2014). The theoretical assumptions and operational components of liberal peacebuilding are very 
familiar: internationally-brokered peace negotiations, often accompanied by peacekeeping forces 
or other forms of military intervention; internationally-monitored elections; a focus on human 
rights, gender equality, and protection for minorities; the promotion of rule of law and Security 
Sector Reform (SSR), and constraints on the use of force by parties to the conflict (Campbell et 
al, 2011; Newman, et al, 2009). Equally familiar is an extensive critique of the liberal peace, both a 
‘problem-solving’ critique, which sought to improve the efficacy of these programmes, by 
discussing the timeliness of intervention or the appropriate sequencing of liberalisation policies 
(Paris, 2004; see Pugh, 2009: 88-89), and a ‘paradigm-shifting’ critique, which argued that the 
ideological underpinnings of liberal peace denied any agency to local actors and obscured sources 
of conflict resulting from an exploitative international economic system and a neo-colonial, 
Western-led international order  (Pugh 2005; Duffield, 2007; Richmond 2012; Richmond and 
MacGinty, 2015).  
This foundational critique offered a riposte to the hubris of liberal internationalism, but scholars 
failed to identify viable policy alternatives (Begby and Burgess, 2009; Paris, 2010). Critics argued 
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in favour of ‘a sustainable, emancipatory, and empathetic form of peace’ (Richmond 2016, 47), but 
struggled to define what this might mean in concrete situations. Duffield called for a Foucauldian 
‘solidarity of the governed’ (2007) and Pugh advocated a new paradigm of ‘Life Welfare’ (2009), 
but the political content of such ideas was unclear. The idea of a ‘hybrid peace’ relied on post-
colonial understandings of hybridity to argue for a fusion of local and international initiatives, and 
promised a peace that was negotiated, situational and context-specific (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012; 
Krause, 2012; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011; Richmond, 2012, 2015). However, the concept lacked 
analytical clarity, often being used as shorthand for almost any situation of political contestation 
between diverse social or ideological forces, or any interaction between the ‘local’ and the 
‘international’. Most significantly, the concept of hybridity occluded discussion of the most 
obvious lacuna in discussions of ‘liberal’ and ‘post-liberal peace’: situations in which cessation of 
armed violence is achieved in ways that are neither ‘liberal’ nor ‘hybrid’, but unashamedly 
authoritarian. The hybridity literature mentioned, but did not explore, ‘a situation of peace... 
combined with predominantly illiberal norms, institutions, and practices’ (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012: 
2).  Richmond saw a threat of ‘negative forms of hybrid peace in which structural violence and 
inequality remain’ (Richmond, 2015: 59), but there was no theoretical unpacking of such a form 
of ‘peace’.  
These existing debates in peace and conflict studies have proved inadequate to deal with the 
reality of many recent cases of civil war termination, which have often involved either an outright 
military victory, or the emergence of a post-war authoritarian political order after an initial 
negotiated peace. Although the immediate post-Cold War period witnessed a significant rise in 
negotiated peace processes, comprising 41 per cent of all civil war terminations in the 1990s (Toft, 
2010: 6), Kovacs and Svensson (2013) argue that after 2009-10 there was a return to the historical 
norm of military victory as the most common mode of civil war termination. Even in wars that 
ended in negotiated settlements, the model of a ‘war to democracy transition’ was rarely achieved 
(Jarstad and Sisk, 2008). In a study of 130 civil wars, Toft (2010) calculates that a government 
victory typically results in an increase in authoritarianism by one-two points on the POLITY scale 
over a 20 year period. Negotiated settlements, however, fare even worse. Some short-term 
democratisation is typical after a peace process, but the data suggest that states evolve into 
significantly more authoritarian political orders between five and 20 years after the end of a civil 
war (Toft, 2010: 63-65). Power-sharing agreements typically served as an interim phase in a 
trajectory towards an authoritarian, one-sided outcome to the conflict. Deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation also did little to guarantee a democratic outcome. Of 19 major 
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peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War era, only nine resulted in some form of democratic 
political system five years after a peacebuilding mission was initiated (Zurcher et al, 2013: 2-3).  
We do not attempt here a definitive universe of cases of authoritarian modes of conflict 
management, but  identify a range of cases where a shift away from liberal mechanisms of conflict 
resolution has been evident since 2000. These include not only cases of military victory, but also 
post-conflict orders following negotiated settlements, and modes of conflict management in so-
called ‘frozen conflicts’. The starkest shift in policy was in Sri Lanka, where an internationally-
mediated peace process collapsed in 2006, to be replaced by a brutal counterinsurgency that 
defeated the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 (Goodhand, 2010; Lewis, 
2010, 2011). A shift from peace talks to counterinsurgency also took place in Eastern Turkey, as 
conflict resumed between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) after 2015. 
Russia rejected any international involvement or negotiation during the Second Chechen War 
(1999-2003), pursuing instead a military victory and a post-conflict authoritarian order inside 
Chechnya (Russell 2012). China’s campaign against a low-level Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang also 
relied on authoritarian mechanisms and state coercion (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014). Authoritarian 
dynamics were also evident in state responses to recent internal conflicts in Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sudan and elsewhere, and in moves to prevent conflicts occurring, as 
in Uzbekistan’s June 2010 operation to pre-empt the spread of ethnic-based violence from 
neighbouring Kyrgyzstan (Khamidov 2015). Angola, Cambodia and Tajikistan all experienced 
internationally-mediated peace negotiations in the 1990s, but quickly developed non-democratic 
regimes, which managed further internal conflict or unrest through authoritarian practices (Soares 
de Oliveira, 2011; Heathershaw, 2009a, 2009b). Against this backdrop, an internationally-brokered 
peace agreement with the Farc rebel movement in Colombia in November 2016 appeared to be 
an exception rather than a reversal of a wider illiberal trend. 
To some extent these shifts in norms can be traced to China and Russia’s growing influence in 
the international system. Both states provided diplomatic, political and sometimes military support 
to governments involved in state violence and mass human rights abuses, including Myanmar, 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Zimbabwe, and began to undermine liberal peacebuilding norms in 
international forums, including the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council in 
Geneva (Lewis, 2010).  At the same time, many  Western states - led by the US – failed to 
adequately condemn abuses perpetrated by state forces during conflicts, such as those in Egypt 
and Yemen. Even in circumstances where international peacebuilders were present - as Barnett 
and Zürcher (2008) have argued -  international actors were often willing to acquiesce in a form of 
‘compromised peacebuilding’, in which demands for political reforms were acknowledged in 
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symbolic terms, but seldom implemented. This ‘virtual peacebuilding’ (Heathershaw, 2009a) 
permitted the unimpeded development of authoritarian regimes in states such as Tajikistan, while 
the economic successes of authoritarian development models in post-conflict states such as 
Ethiopia and Rwanda encouraged donors to overlook a lack of progress in human rights and 
democracy (Jones, Soares de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2012).  
Despite this empirical record, scholars of peacebuilding and conflict resolution have seldom 
engaged in theorizing or conceptualising  authoritarian responses to conflict. Indeed, Toft (2010: 
150) notes that 90 per cent of academic work is devoted to negotiated civil war settlements rather 
than military victories. The idea of a ‘victor’s peace’ – characterised by militaristic, state-centric 
approaches – has been in common usage, but remains under-theorised (Goodhand, 2010; 
Piccolino, 2015; Richmond, 2005). The term ‘realist peace’ was usually understood in terms of its 
contribution to international systemic stability (Newman, 2009), although Megoran has argued that 
the vision of realist peace held by early twentieth-century thinkers mirrored their commitment to 
internal policies of coercion (Megoran, 2013). Other analysis focuses solely on the use of military 
force: cross-national studies of civil war termination typically code such outcomes as ‘military 
victories’, without much attention to authoritarian political initiatives that accompany the use of 
force (Diaz & Murshed, 2013; Kovacs and Svensson, 2013; Toft, 2010). However, at the country 
level, several recent studies have begun to address this gap in the scholarship, offering a more 
detailed study of authoritarian practices, characterised as ‘illiberal peacebuilding’ in Indonesia 
(Smith, 2014), ‘illiberal peace’ in Sri Lanka (Lewis, 2010) and Chechnya (Russell, 2012), or 
‘authoritarian peacebuilding’ in Angola and Chechnya (Baglione, 2008; Soares de Oliveira, 2011).  
We build on this literature to conceptualise authoritarian approaches to conflict management, 
but also engage with new work on civil wars that draws from comparative work on authoritarian 
political orders. Similar to our own approach to political economy, North et al note that Limited 
Access Orders (LAO) are effective at ‘manipulating the economy to produce rents, motivate 
stability, and reduce violence’, and ‘solve the problem of violence by using the political system to 
create and allocate rents’ (2011: 6, 2). Elsewhere, a more micro-level and mechanism-based 
approach has gradually emerged (King 2004, Kalyvas 2006, Bennett 2013). Staniland (2014) and 
Driscoll (2015) have demonstrated the value of bottom-up approaches focusing on practices and 
inter-factional pacts. The lesson of this research is that political stability may emerge from inter-
factional deals or negotiated political settlements; however, hierarchy often matures and is 
consolidated in an authoritarian polity, often on the basis of what Slater terms a ‘protection pact’ 
(Slater, 2010). Authoritarianism – defined classically by Linz as ‘political systems with limited, not 
responsible, political pluralism’ where ‘a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined 
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limits’ (1964: 255) – remains the most common mode of governance in post-conflict states.  
However, recent literature on authoritarianism goes beyond the traditional focus on institutions 
(Linz 1964) and psychological types (Adorno et al 1950, Altemeyer 1981) to a focus on ‘practices’, 
in the sense deployed by the practice turn in political science. These practices may be spatial (Adler 
& Pouliot 2011), discursive (Wedeen 1999) or political-economic (Hale 2015), a categorisation that 
we deploy in our own framework. In this article we build on these different literatures and further 
unpack the dynamics of authoritarian modes of conflict management in a way that frames an 
emerging comparative research agenda. 
 
Authoritarian Conflict Management 
 
Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) entails the prevention, de-escalation or termination of 
organised armed rebellion or other mass social violence such as inter-communal riots through 
methods that eschew genuine negotiations among parties to the conflict, reject international 
mediation and constraints on the use of force, disregard calls to address underlying structural 
causes of conflict, and instead rely instead on instruments of state coercion and hierarchical 
structures of power. Although ACM relies on state violence, it is not simply a military campaign 
of ‘all-out war’ (Diaz and Murshed, 2013). While we recognise the centrality of violence in these 
cases, the use of state coercion alone is not sufficient to achieve ongoing conflict management. 
The sporadic or egregious use of brutal force or military action against rebel forces, without 
accompanying political, social and economic policies, does not constitute a long-term strategy 
designed to manage conflict. Rather we seek to highlight the importance of a much wider range of 
authoritarian practices which contribute to wartime and post-conflict order.  
Theories of conflict are often roughly categorised in three groups, ascribing causal power to 
grievances, to economic greed, or to simple opportunity, arising from state weakness (Cederman 
and Vogt 2017). Proponents of ACM deny claims that grievances cause rebellion, rather ascribing 
conflict to the greed of political opponents, or as the result of opportunity arising from state 
weakness, in line with the work of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier et al (2009). Policies within 
this authoritarian framework therefore attempt to reduce opportunities and resources for rebel 
mobilization by asserting hegemonic control in different social domains, here categorised as (i) 
public discourse, (ii) space, and (iii) economic resources. Not only does this model combine 
multiple practices and initiatives in different domains of state and social activity, it also acts as a 
sustained mode of governance that encompasses different phases of a conflict, including cessation 
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of armed violence, post-conflict settlement and reconstruction processes, and on-going conflict 
prevention mechanisms.  
Two caveats must be made with regard to ACM’s scope and value. First, while many of the 
mechanisms discussed here are also characteristic of the political rule of authoritarian states in 
general, this mode of governance is aimed specifically at controlling armed conflict and - in theory 
- can be conducted by a democratic or semi-democratic state. It is worth noting that Sri Lanka 
remained a functioning electoral democracy throughout the 2006-09 conflict, and Russia still 
retained many features of a democracy during the Chechen Wars. Rampton and Nadarajah (2017: 
446) argue that we should note ‘the interweaving and therefore the mutual constitution of liberal 
and non-liberal social formations’, rather than making sharp theoretical distinctions between liberal 
and illiberal orders. This is a useful warning against oversimplified binaries, but leaves us with 
limited analytical tools to make distinctions between very different political practices and political 
regimes. Nor is a combination of majoritarian democracy with authoritarian practices in one part 
of the state necessarily best understood as ‘hybrid politics’ (Richmond, 2015, p. 51) or even as a 
‘hybrid political order’ (Smith, 2014). Instead, authoritarian conflict management seeks to 
demarcate a spatial and discursive distinction from other spaces in the state, creating a Schmittian 
state of exception in certain territories or in relation to certain groups in the population. This 
spatial, normative and discursive distinction is often unsustainable, since authoritarian modes of 
managing conflict in democracies -whether in Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Eastern Turkey or the Israeli-
occupied territories – ultimately threaten to undermine the democratic order of the state itself. 
Second, this discussion makes no normative judgement about whether such a mode of conflict 
management can be considered as ‘peace’. The use of the term ‘conflict management’ is not 
designed to offer legitimation to authoritarian practices, but to highlight the extent to which they 
constitute a set of coherent policies and norms, rather than merely an aberration from liberal 
norms of conflict resolution. Recent scholarship has revived the interest of Peace Studies scholars 
in the interpretation of ‘peace’, and reinvigorated a debate over an expanded typology beyond a 
narrow definition of peace as ‘absence of war’ (Regan, 2014; Richmond, 2005, 2016; Diehl, 2016; 
Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010). Höglund and Kovacs (2010), for example, identify 
multiple variants of post-conflict peace, including a concept of ‘fearful peace’, in which the 
‘absence of large-scale violence’ is ‘due to political control and repression from the side of the 
regime in power’ (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010: 384). Such a ‘peace’  clearly does not 
represent what Johan Galtung termed, following Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘positive peace’ (King, 
1956), but it is possible to conceive of situations where many citizens view a top-down, violent 
imposition of state order as the only realistic, temporary alternative to a grim, all-out civil war 
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(Smith, 2014: 1512). However, authoritarian approaches to managing conflict are not necessarily 
sustainable in the long term nor do they offer a possible means to ‘resolve’ a conflict, as understood 
in the traditional schools of ‘conflict resolution’, implying that ‘the deep-seated sources of conflict 
are addressed and transformed’ (see Ramsbotham, et al 2011: 31). Indeed, ACM does not presume 
that conflicts can be ‘resolved’ in the way understood in the traditional Peace Studies literature, by 
addressing underlying needs for security and recognition, articulated by communities as common 
grievances, an approach that strongly influenced the liberal peacebuilding frameworks of the 1990s 
(Azar, 1990; Burton 1990). Instead, following Collier et al (2009), authoritarian approaches seek 
merely to limit the opportunities and economic incentives for rebellion. Policy responses aim only 
to achieve the constant ‘management’ of the conflict, understood here in the narrow sense used 
by Ramsbotham et al. as ‘the settlement and containment of violent conflict’ (Ramsbotham et al 
2011: 31). Such a mode of conflict management ensures an ongoing necessity for repressive 
policies of illiberal governance, and rejects attempts to achieve  ‘a radical transformation of society 
away from structures of coercion and violence to an embedded culture of peace’ (Keating and 
Knight, 2004: xxxiv), viewing such policies as both utopian and destabilizing. 
Shifts in discourse and practice at both the global and the local level have produced a serious 
challenge to the dominance of the liberal peace in global governance. However, the nature of 
emerging illiberal alternatives to liberal peace is poorly theorised and often miscategorised, either 
as a variant of hybrid peace, or simply as a military victory; or they are discussed primarily in 
normative or legal terms, in relation to human rights abuses or war crimes. In the final sections we 
attempt to understand the functioning of authoritarian modes of conflict management in a 
different way, by assessing practices within three fundamental categories of social life: firstly, 
discourse, and then, space and economy.  
Discursive practices 
Although liberal peacebuilding has been criticised as forming a dominant discourse, which 
promoted its own hegemonic meanings of ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ (Autesserre, 2014; Kühn 2012; 
Lewis, 2017), in practice liberal approaches to conflict resolution usually relied on informal 
negotiation strategies or formal peace processes to attempt to reconcile different narratives and 
discourses regarding the nature of the conflict and the most appropriate path to peace (eg  
Zartman, 2008). However, authoritarian approaches to conflict view such attempts to open up 
space for discussion and communication as counter-productive and potentially dangerous, offering 
opportunities for potential rebels to articulate grievances and mobilize both internal and external 
support. Instead, authoritarian conflict management constrains dissenting voices and promotes a 
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hegemonic discourse that seeks to achieve the delegitimization of armed opponents of the state as 
potential partners for negotiation.  
Authoritarian actors achieve these aims in three ways. First, they coerce or repress alternative 
sources of information and interpretations of events, and seek to control news dissemination and 
knowledge production. Traditional modes of censorship have become more difficult to maintain 
in an era of technological change, but governments remain highly adept at restricting access to 
conflict-affected areas for journalists and researchers. In Ethiopia journalists required special 
permission to visit the conflict-affected Ogaden region, but such permission was routinely denied. 
At least one foreign journalist found themselves detained as a result (Blair, 2008). After the 
renewed Turkish counterinsurgency against the Kurdish PKK in 2015, more than 70 ‘security 
zones’  were established in parts of Eastern Turkey that prevented easy access and movement for 
journalists (RSF, 2016). In 2016 in Myanmar the military blocked access for journalists, academics 
and aid workers to large parts of the province of Maungdaw, where ‘[r]eports have emerged of 
mass arrests, torture, the burning of villages, killings of civilians and the systematic rape of 
Rohingya women by Burmese soldiers’ (Economist, 2016). Journalists who overcome restrictions 
to report on conflicts face more serious repercussions, including physical attacks and extrajudicial 
killings. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 19 journalists were killed in Sri 
Lanka between 1999 and 2015, primarily because of their reporting on the conflict 
(https://www.cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka/). Many of the 56 journalists killed in Russia in 1992-
2016 covered the conflict in Chechnya, including, most famously, Anna Politkovskaya, who was 
assassinated in Moscow in October 2006.  
Second, authoritarian regimes act through the production of official discourse. Typically, 
authoritarian discourses in conflict zones aim to delegitimise opponents and undermine claims that 
rebel campaigns are motivated by legitimate grievances. Existing ethnic divides may be mapped 
onto the discourse of the War on Terror in order to legitimise a securitised response. Russia 
rejected claims by Chechen rebels to be the legitimate representatives of the Chechen people, and 
instead portrayed them solely within the discursive frame of Islamist terrorism (Russell, 2011). 
After 2006 the Sri Lankan government portrayed the LTTE as a purely terrorist organisation, 
rejecting their status in the peace process as equal negotiating partners with the government, 
despite both sides’ participation in peace talks in 2001-04. President Mahinda Rajapaksa claimed 
that ‘[t]here is no ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka - as some media mistakenly highlight. Sri Lanka’s 
security forces are fighting a terrorist group, not a particular community’ (Rajapakse, 2009). In 
China Uighur nationalist activists were portrayed primarily as nationalist ‘splittists’ before the 9/11 
attacks,  and as ‘religious extremists’ after 2001. It was only in 2002 that the government began 
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referring widely to ‘terrorists’ in Xinjiang and began linking their domestic crackdown on Uighurs 
to ‘the international struggle against terrorism’ (Dwyer, 2005).  
‘Terrorism’ is not the only discursive device that legitimises extreme responses to opponents of 
the state. Rwanda’s use of a wide-ranging and poorly defined offence of ‘genocide ideology’ 
ostensibly aims to overcome the legacy of inter-ethnic violence, but is used to justify harsh 
measures against opponents and to justify government policy (Beswick, 2010; Thomson, 2011). 
Friend/Enemy discourses also allow the identification of internal ‘fifth columns’, which are 
portrayed as aiding and abetting the enemy. In such situations, not only political opponents, but 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights groups, and international organisations 
are portrayed as antagonistic to the state. In Sri Lanka a range of NGOs and other ‘neutral’ actors, 
which broadly supported the peace process, were labelled as sympathetic to the LTTE, so much 
so that many NGOs refrained from using terms such as ‘peace’ or ‘peacebuilding’ because of the 
ways in which their meaning had been recast in official discourse (Walton, 2008).  In a similar 
mode of discourse, the Ethiopian government used the epithet ‘anti-peace elements’ to justify its 
own brutal counterinsurgency in the Ogaden region in 2005-07. This modern formulation was a 
contemporary reworking of  historical discourse in Ethiopia, which drew on stereotypes among 
settled highlander Ethiopians about Somali pastoralists as ‘violent’ and ‘uncivilised’ and portrayals 
of  the Somali borderland as ‘a largely empty space, devoid of civilization, waiting to become 
civilized by Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic language’ (Hagmann & Korf, 2012: 206-207). 
 As this last example suggests, the most successful discursive strategies both produce and reflect 
social attitudes and opinions. In doing so, they attempt to construct a ‘hegemonic discourse’, 
reflecting what Gramsci refers to as ‘common sense’, the philosophy of non-philosophers, the 
world view shared among the majority of the ordinary population (Gramsci, 1971: 321-331; 
Buttegieg, 2011: 56). Such mechanisms of discourse dissemination acknowledge Van Dijk’s 
argument that ‘dominance may be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of 
text and talk that appear “natural” and quite “acceptable”’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). Such 
popularised discourses often reference and exacerbate already existing social or ethnic cleavages in 
society, or reinforce latent demarcations into ‘in’- and ‘out’-groups. Rampton (2012) argues that in 
Sri Lanka the post-2006 government’s new narrative that promoted a military solution to the 
conflict resonated with the nationalist sentiments of the majority Sinhalese community, in contrast 
to unpopular international discourses, which promoted a compromise resolution of the conflict. 
The circulation of official narratives, tropes and metaphors into everyday conversation and 
discourse produces a kind of ‘deeper hegemony’ that reinforces the official hold over discourse 
(Rampton 2012). Elites use techniques such as ‘recontextualisation’ (Van Leeweun,  2008), 
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whereby ‘hackneyed formulations [are] transferred from the areas of politics and the media into 
semi-public and quasi-private areas’ (Wodak, et al. 1999) to ensure that official ideas and 
interpretations become part of everyday discourse, an accepted view of the world among a majority 
of the population. Although violence is an essential mechanism for maintaining a hegemonic 
discourse in most conflict and post-conflict situations, authoritarian actors are unable to rely solely 
on coercion to maintain discursive stability. 
Spatial Practices 
 
A second priority in non-liberal approaches to managing conflict is the political, physical and 
symbolic dominance of space. The spatial turn in social science, which had long been overlooked 
in peace and conflict studies, has informed an important body of recent work  (Björkdahl and 
Buckley-Zistel, 2016; Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017; Duffield, 2010; Heathershaw and Lambach, 
2008; McConnell, Megoran, and Williams, 2014; Nordstrom, 2003; Smirl, 2008; Walker, 2013). 
Spatial theory – particularly as developed in the 1970s by Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1991) – 
insisted that space was always a contested rather than a fixed category, shaped by conflictual  
political, economic and social forces. Space in turn impacts on social processes in what Edward 
Soja termed a ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ (Soja, 1989: 78). Whereas traditional security thinking viewed 
space as the inert ‘theatre’ or ‘terrain’ on which more fundamental processes happen, spatial theory 
highlights how actors have actively sought to shape space to provide them with advantages in 
conflict (Coward, 2004), to comply with their own normative understandings of political and social 
order (Legg, 2007), and to promote particular dynamics of post-conflict settlement (Toal and 
Dahlman, 2011).  
At least in its ideal type,1 liberal peace-building views space as a potential public sphere – a 
modern-day agora , in which conflict resolution through dialogue may take place. Indeed, spaces 
for negotiation are sometimes deliberately created: a short history of international conflict 
resolution is replete with a string of metonymic place-names: Camp David; Dayton; Rambouillet; 
Oslo; Geneva; Bonn. Peace processes seek ways of removing actors from contested, conflictual 
space to an alternative global archipelago of online and offline space, in which international media, 
institutions and NGOs are dominant and where, it is presumed, complex conflicts may be 
amenable to solution (Henrikson, 2013). More fundamentally, in peace agreements, liberal 
peacemakers often support reconfigurations of political space in ways that address alleged 
                                                 




grievances, particularly of ethnic minorities, through mechanisms such as territorial autonomy or 
even secession.  
Authoritarian conflict management, on the other hand, views space as a resource that can be 
used by would-be rebels, to organise, to recruit, and to extract resources, but also to impose their 
own normative order on a part of the population, potentially strengthening their discursive appeal 
to a wider community. Authoritarian regimes therefore seek to penetrate, close or dominate space 
through military patrols, encampment and occupation, and by the forced re-settlement of civilians, 
and also through major infrastructure projects and urban reconstruction. This re-centring of 
political space in the state is a central objective of conflict management, but is challenged by spatial 
linkages across scales – for example, flows between local and global economies, or online media 
shared by minority groups and their diaspora. Where transborder groups lack such autonomy and 
political representation beyond borders, diasporic rebellion is weak or non-existent (Salehyan 2009; 
Checkel 2013). Authoritarian actors aim to centralise and homogenise spatial politics: the 
alternative, a decentred and heterogeneous spatial politics, with significant pockets of diasporic, 
trans-border or local space, threatens a state’s capacity to maintain political control.   
Military counterinsurgencies result in spaces of exception, where state actors both constrain 
armed rebellion and produce new forms of insecurity among the population. In this space law is 
either formally suspended, or the exceptional nature of the counterinsurgency effectively 
constitutes a de facto state of exception, even in the absence of a declaration of martial law 
(Agamben, 2005: 32-35; Hagmann & Korf, 2012: 210). The state of exception produces variegated 
spaces, in which different practices and norms are observed in diverse formally or informally 
demarcated spaces within the state, or in extraterritorial spaces. Hagmann and Korf provide an 
example from Ethiopia:  
 
‘In times of political and humanitarian crisis, the Ethiopian army and other government agencies 
transform the Ogaden into what resembles a camp, effectively cordoning off the region from foreign 
observers, journalists, NGOs, international organizations and researchers. Concomitantly the 
movement of local Somalis was regularly restricted in a bid to control both persons and information 
that enter and leave the region.’ (Hagmann and Korf, 2012: 211).  
 
Typically such measures require both outer boundaries of control and inner mechanisms of 
penetration of ‘places’. This micro-control is imposed through military tactics such as the Russian 
zachistka, a concept ‘linked to the cleansing of space’ (Gilligan, 2009: 52), which ‘designates an 
operation when a village or town is blocked and, without any sanction from the public prosecutor 
or any witnesses, soldiers search houses one after another and detain all suspicious people’ (Human 
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Rights Centre, 2007). Forced resettlement produces similar effects: in the Ogaden in 2005-08 
villagers were deported and resettled as part of a militarised policy of spatial control (Hagmann 
and Korf, 2012). Such tactics are familiar in other counterinsurgencies, and project state power in 
ways that transform communal and private places, ensuring that there is no potential safe space in 
which power is not exerted over the local population. The results of such policies is a constant – 
but not always successful - attempt by different communities to negotiate safe spaces in conflict 
zones (Ismailbekova 2013; Walker 2013, p. 74). 
Western critics of liberal peacebuilding have accused it of being state-centric (Rampton and 
Nadarajah 2017), but non-Western states have often viewed liberal practices as fatally undermining 
the state, through the assertion of minority rights, territorial autonomy and even outright secession 
in the cases of Kosovo, East Timor and South Sudan. Authoritarian conflict management, on the 
other hand, opposes political autonomy or decentralisation for ethnic minorities, viewing such 
arrangements as destabilising and likely to fuel rather than resolve conflicts. China has labelled 
‘separatism’ as one of the ‘three evils’ (along with terrorism and religious extremism), a trope 
adopted by other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Ambrosio, 2008). In the 
Russian Federation new legislation adopted in December 2013, and stiffened with longer potential 
sentences in 2014, outlawed ‘public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation’. Russia, China and other states have argued that conceding the demands of separatist 
movements tends to prolong conflict rather than resolve it: autonomous institutions, such as 
regional parliaments, provide a spatial resource for further development of secessionist demands, 
allowing ethnically defined political parties to develop patronage and resources to support ongoing 
campaigns for secession.2   
Authoritarian regimes also view the transformation of space through urban planning and 
architecture as means to cement in place new hierarchies of power. The importance of town 
planning for managing conflict in contested and divided cities is increasingly recognised (Gaffikin 
and Morrissey. 2011; O’Connor, 2014). Whereas liberal models advocate a ‘new localism’ of 
devolved, participatory planning (Gaffikin 2015), authoritarian models such as those used in 
Colombo during the civil war militarise urban life to control armed opposition (Pieris 2011; 
Economy and Political Weekly 2013). Such policies are most evident in post-conflict 
reconstruction in urban areas, designed not only for commercial success but also for political ends, 
where newly planned cities are designed ‘to construct, communicate and normalize a particular 
sense of identity to the citizenry’ (Moser, 2013: 39). 
                                                 
2 For more on this discussion, see D. Brancati (2006). 
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In the once ruined Chechen capital of Grozny, the Russian government funded a vast 
reconstruction of the city, under a programme entitled ‘No Traces of War’, effectively obliterating 
physical reminders of conflict and constructing a new narrative of Chechen modernity that served 
to legitimise the post-conflict authoritarian leadership (Mydans, 2011; Gilligan, 2009: 211). In 
Rwanda post-conflict spatial politics included changing place names and holding officially 
sponsored rituals of memorialisation (Thomson, 2011: 443). In the southern Kyrgyzstani city of 
Osh, following inter-ethnic violence in 2010, the Kyrgyz authorities asserted symbolic, spatial 
control over this  city with a historically Uzbek cultural core through the construction of statues 
to ethnic Kyrgyz national heroes at the main entrances to the city (Harrowell 2015). The city 
authorities also promoted plans – ultimately unsuccessful - for urban reconstruction that would 
undermine traditional Uzbek patterns of living in courtyard houses (Megoran 2012). The Chinese 
authorities did succeed in carrying out a reconstruction of Kashgar, through the so-called ‘Kashgar 
Dangerous House Reform’, in which traditional Uighur quarters were destroyed and replaced with 
modern apartment blocks or artificial reconstructions of traditional buildings, designed for 
touristic consumption. The result has been a major displacement of ethnic Uighurs by incoming 
Han Chinese (Clarke, 2016). Such efforts both assert a top-down view of identity that valorises 
Chinese views of modernity over Uighur cultural norms and living patterns and also permit the 
penetration of the state (in all areas, from sanitation to security) into the once private or communal 
areas of Uighur housing.  
 
Economic Practices 
The third significant category of activity for authoritarian modes of conflict management involves 
patterns of intervention in business and the economy that differ significantly from liberal 
frameworks of post-conflict reconstruction. Typically, liberal economic programmes under 
peacebuilding involve poverty reduction programmes to reduce perceived socio-economic 
grievances among the population and economic liberalisation to boost private sector business, and 
overall economic growth, with the aim of producing a ‘peace dividend’. In practice, rapid 
liberalisation of economies and sharp cuts in state spending have sometimes been destabilising 
(Paris, 2004), and post-conflict international interventions have often resulted in informal, 
criminalised and corrupt political economies (Pugh, 2005).  
In authoritarian conflict management, economic interventions are conducted primarily with the 
aim of political stabilisation, with overall economic growth an important, but secondary concern. 
Authoritarian modes of economic governance in conflict-affected societies have two primary aims: 
firstly, to deny rebels access to economic and financial resources; and, secondly, to ensure that 
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loyal clientelist groups control are the main beneficiaries of financial flows through the conflict 
zone. Following Hale (2015), we use a distinction between ‘single-patron’ and ‘multiple-patron’ 
orders.  Established autocracies have a single-pyramid of patronal politics and are sustained by the 
pervasive expectation that this network will endure (Hale, 2015: 36-7).  ‘War-time political orders’ 
(Staniland 2014) are often multiple-pyramids, however; therefore a post-conflict process of 
consolidation can often be characterised as the transformation of a multiple-pyramid patronal 
order into a single-pyramid system. Such measures of economic control and co-optation often 
provide the most durable practices of conflict management. Effective modes of authoritarian 
conflict management aim to construct something close to a single-pyramid system, but complex, 
open, and highly diversified economies make such an outcome more difficult to achieve.  
Constructing a single-patron order often involves active engagement in what scholars have 
termed a ‘political market place’ (De Waal, 2014). Patrons may bid for the loyalty of militias, who 
auction their services to the highest bidder, although state agencies may also use coercion to ‘fix’ 
the market in its favour. Meanwhile, central flows of funds from budgets, oil revenues or 
international aid are channelled to close allies and loyal patronage networks. Post-conflict regimes 
develop ‘secretive formal or informal structures for running the reconstruction process’, which 
distribute the benefits of post-war reconstruction to loyal insiders and allies’ (Soares de Oliveira, 
2011). According to Hale, such patronal political economy is ‘the norm throughout all recorded 
human history’ (Hale, 2015: 28). Certainly, these hierarchical patronal systems are characteristic of 
post-conflict environments. In Cambodia Roberts argues that ‘political change has been superficial 
and remains … dominated by informal, socially-ruled systems of patronage and clientilism, rather 
than determined by impartial, independent and impersonal institutions’ (Roberts, 2009, p. 149). In 
Angola Soares de Oliveira notes ‘the overtly political manner in which the state apparatus is used 
to provide insiders with opportunities for accumulation of vast fortunes’ (Soares de Oliveira, 
2011).   
Although often viewed as detrimental to long-term peace, certain forms of corruption may be 
intrinsic to post-war settlements and help glue the peace together (Leenders 2012, Zaum & Cheng 
2011). In North’s conceptual framework of the Limited Access Order, corruption and rent-seeking 
are central elements in the creation of a system that limits the potential for violence (North, et al, 
2013). Elites eschew violence because it reduces the income elites receive from ‘extortion and 
corrupt payoffs, […] land rent, natural resource royalties, and monopoly profits’ (North, et al. 
2011: 2). In Chechnya, for example, the Russian government has invested at least 14 billion dollars 
in post conflict reconstruction since 2001 (Yaffa, 2016, 75). Although such funding is primarily 
directed through state agencies, there is little doubt that it has also been personally controlled by 
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members of local elite patronage networks, contributing to the construction of a single-pyramid 
order (Schwirtz 2011; Zabyelina 2013). What is labelled corruption by outsiders (almost $700m in 
2003 and $600m in 2004 were reportedly lost from Russian budgetary allocations to Chechnya due 
to ‘financial violations’ [Hughes 2007: 126]) is primarily a way of rewarding political loyalty in an 
informal vertical hierarchy of power, or – as Zabyelina (2013) frames it, a way of ‘buying peace’.  
In response to a political economy of control, potential and actual rebels seek alternative sources 
of funding, including organised crime, diaspora funding, and international aid. State actors in 
conflict zones therefore seek to control not only licit business, but also assert control over criminal 
enterprises and illicit trafficking, if necessary by subcontracting such activities to loyal criminal 
structures or taking them over directly. In post-conflict Tajikistan, for example, the conflict over 
trafficking in drugs from Afghanistan has been an important part of a process of regime 
consolidation and state-building (De Daniele, 2011). Diaspora funding – a major source of rebel 
funding - is more difficult for political regimes to control, even where they control banks and other 
financial institutions. Rebel movements are adept at both collecting informal taxation from 
diasporas and also transmitting it to fund rebellions at home (Adamson 2013). Humanitarian aid 
offers a third source of funding. International humanitarian agencies are willing to deal with armed 
non-state actors in ways that may provide access to economic resources for rebels as well as the 
wider population (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). In response, states such as Sri Lanka or Rwanda co-
opted some aid agencies, while expelling or silencing others (ODI, 2010). 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that the emerging alternative to the discourses and practices of liberal 
peace is not a more emancipatory or hybrid form of peacebuilding, but a form of conflict 
management characterised by authoritarian practices and illiberal norms. Authoritarian conflict 
management seeks to  prevent, de-escalate or terminate violent conflict within a state through the 
hegemonic control of public discourse, space, and economic resources rather than by the liberal 
model of compromise, negotiation and power-sharing. Although international institutions and 
transnational civil society remain at least nominally committed to liberal peacebuilding models 
(with declining support from some Western governments), many emerging powers and 
authoritarian regimes facing rebellions are dissatisfied with the internationalisation of their internal 
conflicts or the constraints on sovereignty and on the use of force that the liberal peace involves. 
Instead, they have invoked sovereignty norms to enable the pursuit of authoritarian modes of 
conflict management inside the state. These policies aims to end or pre-empt armed rebellion not 
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only through military action, but through a broad range of political, economic, social and symbolic 
practices. Through these authoritarian practices the state seeks to achieve a hegemonic discourse 
that delegitimises opponents, control of space – physically, politically and symbolically,  and a form 
of political economy that approximates as far as possible to a hierarchical, single-patron order. 
Examining conflict management through these three categories of discourse, space and 
economic resources provides a framework which allows us to understand better the main dynamics 
of authoritarian approaches to internal conflict in different political contexts. Authoritarian modes 
do not always succeed and an evaluation of their effectiveness in achieving discursive stability, 
centred space and a single-pyramid patronal economy is for future research.  Moreover, we do not 
downplay the level of coercion and state violence employed in these methods of conflict 
management: these will rightly remain the most important focus in ethical assessments of such 
policies. The widespread abuses and violence against civilians that accompany authoritarian modes 
of conflict governance are only too evident in recent conflicts. ACM often entails the deployment 
of morally unacceptable practices which are unlikely to be successful in containing conflict over 
the long-term if structural violence and enduring grievances remain unaddressed.  However, to 
advocate viable alternatives to this ‘authoritarian turn’ in conflict management requires an 
understanding of these modes of conflict management that goes beyond a moral condemnation 
of excessive use of violence or abuses of human rights. Instead, a focus on discourse, spatial 
politics and political economy opens up a new agenda for conflict research that offers critical 
insights into non-liberal norms and policies, but also lays the theoretical groundwork for new 
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